INTRODUCTION
Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement (PA) suggests "cooperative approaches" by which Parties could use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) to achieve their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and ensure environmental integrity and transparency. 1 The PA recognizes in various articles that the provision of This Article investigates how ETSs can enhance transparency in tracking GHG emissions and other climate efforts in the PA context. I will proceed with four sections as follows. The first two sections identify key issues and governance challenges for operationalizing cooperative approaches and market-related transparency provisions of the PA. It draws mainly from Parties' submissions and the discussions around these provisions. In each section, I locate and discuss the innovative aspects of the PA that could support future ETS initiatives and compare those aspects to the market mechanisms and the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) system in the pre-PA era. Next, I examine how developing domestic ETSs and linking them can enhance climate transparency. Section 3 considers the minimum requirements that could qualify an ETS as transparent. Taking China's evolving ETS as an example, I highlight how the process of building MRV capacities for a functional ETS enhances GHG accounting and reporting. Section 4 analyzes how linking ETSs across borders like the linkages between California, Québec, and Ontario can improve data reporting and facilitate information sharing.
I do not try to define "transparency." I examine the PA's provisions regarding market-based approaches and transparency to illustrate how they can become operational with experience and lessons from using ETSs. 12 I hope that the current literature on transparency and ETSs can engage more in analyzing their interactions, and that best practices from either domestic ETSs or bilateral and regional partnerships can inform the negotiation and resolution of the issues left on the agenda of the APA and SBSTA for completing the work program related to the implementation of the PA (PAWP). Three instruments-guidance on cooperative approaches (article 6.2); rules, modalities, and procedures for a sustainable development mechanism (article 6.4); and a work program for non-market approaches (article 6.8)-are taking forward the operation of the PA's article 6 provisions. 13 The analysis below is in part dedicated to cooperative approaches that may favor the establishment of carbon markets. This way, Parties can transfer mitigation outcomes to achieve GHG emissions reduction goals. Therefore, I focus on articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the PA.
The agreement provides broad outlines for what voluntary cooperation could look like even when thorny issues that could enhance their implementation remain "reasonably ambiguous." 14 Previous U.N. climate change negotiations, especially those under SBSTA, featured intense discussions on the clarification and interpretation of those issues in an attempt to complete the guidance referred to in article 6.2, that would constitute an important part of the PAWP. 15 Decision 1/CP.21 requested that SBSTA should develop a guidance that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) adopts at its first session. 16 It specifically identified the need for guidance on avoiding double counting when Parties adjust their GHG emissions and removals covered by their NDCs. 17 SBSTA 45 noted Parties' efforts to discuss articles 6.2 and 6.3 and their determination to reach "a common understanding of the matters related to the guidance." 18 
13.
United The informal note prepared by the co-chairs for discussing article 6.2, which recorded Parties' contributions at SBSTA 47, gives some insights to the content and tone of the guidance. With that said, the elements in this note are preliminary and "should not be considered as final or exhaustive in any way." 19 In Table 1 , I list the elements that are relevant to the discussion in this Article. Some of them will be discussed in greater detail below. The governance of cooperative approaches and the scope and definition of ITMOs are open questions. 23 They need further examination to see if they can be feasible means of fulfilling NDCs. The wording of articles 6.2 and 6.3 does not appear to keep the governance of cooperative approaches within the PA, in that neither article requires decisions to be made by the CMA. 24 Cooperation may be "bilateral, plurilateral, and possibly multilateral," or involve the "linking of cap-and-trade systems, or other types of trading systems."
25 Some Parties whose submissions favored a broad interpretation, which allows a wide spectrum of cooperation that involves ITMOs, shared this view. 26 Others saw the scope of article 6.2 in
23.
See Draft Elements for SBSTA Agenda Item 11(a), supra note 6, at part 6 (g) (noting that Parties considered ITMOs may be defined by the CMA or by Parties that would implement cooperative approaches); see also 31 That situation should be avoided through the cooperative approaches offered under the PA.
The more decentralized governance of the PA's article 6.2 may incentivize the participation of developed country Parties that have circumvented cooperation through the KP's market mechanisms. Article 6.2 may also encourage participation of non-Annex B Parties to the KP, which assume non-binding targets and cannot use the international emissions trading under the KP's article 17. For example, as neither Canada nor the U.S. is Party to the KP, the KP's market mechanisms did not apply to them. Now, they can make the most of the PA's article 6.2. Though the U.S. will in fact be withdrawing from the PA, the U.S. is still a Party until the conditions for withdrawal under article 28 are fulfilled. 32 Article 6.2 is also appealing to countries like China and Korea, which are non-Annex B Parties to the KP, and are now enthusiastically using ETSs to help achieve their NDCs. 33 The bottom-up initiatives, such as linkages of ETSs among Parties or even subnational entities, are therefore promising. Though article 6.2 only mentions Parties, when read together with article 6.3, it reveals the potential participation of non-Party entities if the use of ITMOs is authorized by participating Parties. 34 Section 4 of this Article will provide a detailed analysis of linking subnational ETSs and its relation to the PA's articles 6.2 and 6.3.
II. MARKET-RELATED TRANSPARENCY
This section discusses the PA provisions relevant to both market-based cooperation and transparency of climate action. International rules on the MRV system have evolved over the past few years. The established MRV system, under the UNFCCC, runs "different, but seemingly parallel, 31 .
GOVERNANCE OF ARTICLE 6, supra note 14, at 2, 4; see also ROBERT O. KEOHANE & DAVID G. VICTOR, THE REGIME COMPLEX FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 19 (2011) (taking the CDM and the KP's "docking" rules as typical examples of the "counterproductive rigidities that are often built into comprehensive regimes.").
32. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 28 (specifying the procedure for withdrawing from the PA).
33. Also, the PA has an enhanced and flexible transparency framework which "shall build upon and eventually supersede" the existing MRV system.
37
The PA refers to transparency throughout its text, and article 13 in particular requires Parties to regularly report on their GHG emissions, removals, implementation efforts, and to submit reports for expert and peer review. 38 Parties are now negotiating and developing the MPGs for this transparency framework to be included in the PAWP.
39
While the detailed MPGs are subject to further negotiation, a review of the instruments available from negotiations to date may illustrate the outlook for the incoming framework and inform what should be considered for realizing transparency in market-based cooperation. At an MPGs workshop before APA 1-3, experts from the Parties and regional groups discussed article 6 in the context of relevant information necessary to track progress toward implementing and achieving NDC goals. 40 Some suggested that only Parties that use article 6 report on their use of this article, and that separate guidance for tracking ITMOs be developed under SBSTA and 41 In the light of Parties' deliberations at APA 1-4, co-facilitators of the MPGs negotiations revealed how article 6 could be addressed through transparency provisions. 42 The most relevant elements I have identified from their informal note are: national inventory report; information to track progress; technical expert review; and multilateral consideration. 43 Each element, as shown in Table 2 , has included suggestions for the use of article 6 and cooperative approaches. When it comes to "information to track progress," the facilitators peculiarly noted "information related to article 6"-that is, (1) information concerning ITMO activities (e.g., creation, holding, transfer), cooperative approaches, and how environmental integrity is ensured; (2) institutional arrangements for operating registries, trading systems, and undertaking ITMO activities; and (3) governance and procedural arrangements that ensure double counting is avoided. Avoidance of double counting; promoting environmental integrity and transparency; linkage with article 6.2; building on and enhancing the transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC; flexibility to those developing countries that need it given their capacities; facilitating improved reporting and transparency over time
National Inventory Report
National circumstances and institutional arrangements; reporting guidance: methods, sectors and gases (including those covered by article 6 activities), time series, and frequency; constraints and capacity-building needs; improvement plans; submission process; reporting formats and tables (including consistency with agreed rules under article 6.2)
Information to Track Progress
Description and updates of a Party's NDC; progress in implementing its NDC (including information on the application of cooperative approaches); summary of GHG emissions and removals (and their projections); information on Parties' accounting under articles 4.13 and 4.14; information related to article 6; and capacity-building needs 41 .
Id. at ¶ ¶ 42 (b), (d). 42.
Draft Elements for APA 1-4 Agenda Item 5, supra note 37.
43.
Id. at parts B-C, G-H.
44.
For a complete list see id. at part C.10.
45.
Id. at parts A-C, G-H.
Technical Expert Review
Increasing transparency of information provided under article 13.7; sharing good practices and lessons learned; identifying best practice examples; assessing the consistency of information with the accounting guidance under article 6.2; information to be reviewed; format and steps (including roles of Parties and the secretariat); review team and institutional arrangements; frequency and timing (and additional requirements for Parties cooperating under article 6) Multilateral Consideration Sharing experiences, lessons learned, and best practices from Parties and registered observers; information to be considered (including that on participation in voluntary cooperation under article 6)
Under the SBSTA negotiating track, Parties have reflected on a range of issues concerning the contribution of reporting on article 6 activities to the assessment of efforts made toward Parties' NDCs. "Transparency" was listed as one of the elements in the informal note on article 6.2 that captured Parties' views from their pre-SBSTA 46 submissions and informal consultations during SBSTA 46. 46 The discussions at SBSTA 47 unfolded more details about transparency requirements for participating in ITMOrelated activities. The resulting informal note, as Table 1 outlines, has separate draft elements captioned "accounting," "reporting," and "review," each containing specifics and options for further consideration. 47 Article 13 connects with article 6.2 such that the MPGs for the transparency framework may guide Parties to report on their practice with respect to sustainable development and environmental integrity. 48 This is because article 6.2 only explicitly mentions guidance on accounting but less clearly on either sustainable development or environmental integrity. Conversely, the development of guidance and other arrangements under article 6 may inform the reporting (e.g., content, format, and timing) under article 13. The information to track progress for achieving NDCs would necessarily include information relevant to cooperative approaches and the use of ITMOs. 49 A vivid example of this connection is when drafting 47. Draft Elements for SBSTA Agenda Item 11(a), supra note 6, at parts 12-14.
48.
See MARCU, REFLECTIONS BEFORE SB 44, supra note 27, at 2 (indicating that there are linkages between article 6 and article 13).
49. In Parties' submissions relating to article 6, see e.g., Brazil, supra note 27, at ¶ 13 (stating "the 6.2 guidance would consist of an additional 'layer' for the implementation of transparency elements for the MPGs, the facilitators had placeholders for outputs from SBSTA regarding information to track progress, article 6-related information, and information to be expert-reviewed. 50 ETSs and relevant bilateral or plurilateral partnerships indicate an encouraging scenario that should fall within the scope of cooperative approaches. ETSs are closely interrelated to transparency as they apparently influence each other. Analysts have noted the crucial role of transparency in developing and operating ETSs. 51 They also recognize the necessity for a transnational transparency framework due to the greater likelihood of linking ETSs in various jurisdictions. 52 One key indicator of whether an ETS is transparent is whether it applies uniform rules for the MRV to track compliance, coupled with enforcement measures and liability for noncompliance. 53 Such rules and measures support access to accurate and credible emissions data, which helps determine the emission cap for an ETS and the quantity of allowances regulated emitters have to obtain and surrender in a compliance period. 54 Those emitters are required to regularly report their emissions to competent authorities in accordance with MRV rules. 55 There are also many emitters that bear no obligation to report but still voluntarily disclose their emissions information. 56 Voluntary disclosure commitments under Article 13 and for NDCs accounting under Article 4.13 of the Paris Agreement."); Australia, supra note 7 at 2 (saying "Parties should demonstrate consistency with principles and standards of environmental integrity when they report under Article 13.7 on their use of cooperative approaches."); see also PARTY SUBMISSIONS BEFORE MARRAKECH, supra note 7, at 9; DAGNET ET AL., supra note 37, at 13. 50. Draft Elements for APA 1-4 Agenda Item 5, supra note 37, at parts C.4, 10, G.4.14.
51 , at 3 (indicating that market participants and the public are more likely to trust carbon markets when they are transparent); GOVERNANCE OF ARTICLE 6, supra note 14, at 3 (indicating that transparency is a fundamental principle for an international carbon market); BREWER & MEHLING, supra note 11, at 182 (indicating that international governance structures are crucial to market integrity).
53. Some jurisdictions with ETSs adopt enforcement measures for non-compliance. For example, California has regulations providing penalties for non-compliance by regulated entities, such as failing to surrender compliance instruments to fulfill their compliance obligation. See the text accompanying note 61. See also complements mandatory reporting and encourages broader public participation. 57 Governments, companies, investors, and the public can access reliable, consistent, and comparable climate information that can generate benefits both domestically and internationally. 58 The analysis above shows that a transparent MRV of GHG emissions is essential to an operational ETS. Taking a step further, I argue that the process of building an ETS and linking ETSs in various jurisdictions can enhance transparency in relation to reporting GHG emissions, accounting, and other climate actions, including those in the PA context. Further details of how this can be achieved in practice are discussed in Sections 3 and 4 below.
III. HOW CAN ETSS ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY?
A growing body of evidence on established and emerging ETSs finds some positive contributions that ETSs have made to promoting transparency on climate action. Drawing on the practice in North America and China, this section will show that a transparent MRV is necessary for an effective ETS and developing and operating an ETS can benefit MRV.
A. Evaluating Transparency of an ETS
As discussed earlier, having uniform MRV rules in place is pivotal to ensuring the transparency of an ETS. It has also been noted that a transparent ETS should at least possess open platforms for auctioning allowances, have updated and accessible (online) public information, and apply national frameworks that are in conformity with international standards. 59 Developing these features is therefore necessary for an ETS to effectively promote transparency.
57.
This Jurisdictions with established or comparatively mature ETSs have scaled up or designed new rules for operating those ETSs. California's capand-trade (C&T) program has been "praised for its highly transparent and inclusive consultation process." 60 It is equipped with a set of legislation and regulations to safeguard its operation. For instance, its rules provide detailed requirements on compliance instruments, registration, GHG allowance and allocation, compliance by covered entities, trading and banking, linkage to external ETSs, offset credits, and enforcement and penalties. 61 The Air Resources Board (ARB), which governs the C&T program, held a public hearing on June 29, 2017 to consider proposed amendments to the Mandatory GHG Emissions Reporting. 62 The ARB runs a website that announces and updates C&T-related legal instruments and system operation information.
63
It is worth noting that California built its C&T program in accordance with the design recommendations from the Western Climate Initiative (WCI); the WCI is a regional, market-based cooperative forum to address climate change involving some American states and Canadian provinces. 64 The WCI published instruments that took note of partner jurisdictions' consensus on policy recommendations and detailed designs for the C&T program. 65 64. Presently, California and Québec are continuing to work together through the WCI to develop and harmonize their ETS policies. See WCI Iɴᴄ., https://www.wci-inc.org [https://perma.cc/62FB-ZT3D] (last visited Sept. 14, 2018) (detailing the continuing work WCI does with California and Québec by providing "administrative and technical services to support the implementation of state and provincial greenhouse gas emissions trading programs."). In 2011, the WCI was incorporated to WCI, Inc., which is a non-profit corporation "providing administrative and technical services to its participants to support and facilitate the implementation of their cap-and-trade programs for reducing greenhouse gas emissions." Agreement on the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-andTrade Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Que.-Cal.-Ont., preamble at ¶ 2, Sept. 22, 2017, Office of the Premier of Ont., https://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2017/09/agreement-on-theharmonization-and-integration-of-cap-and-trade-programs-for-reducing-greenhouse-gas. information pertaining to program operation, and transparency for each jurisdiction's allowance budget-setting, auctioning, and emission allowance tracking. 66 Québec and Ontario have also adopted the WCI's recommendations. 67 These two Canadian provinces have developed similar environmentally rigorous C&T programs and transparency standards. Québec, for example, requires covered entities to report their GHG emissions according to the standards set in the Mandatory Reporting Regulation. 68 Québec's C&T-relevant legislation and regulations together with information and guides concerning program operation and participation are online and publicly accessible. 69 Ontario employs comparative measures to ensure the transparency and accountability of its program. 70 Its Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy Act requires an annual status report on the province's Climate Change Action Plan. 71 This report includes information on projects and priorities to be funded by C&T proceeds. 72 Furthermore, Québec is determined to align its C&T design and operation with the "concepts and principles" set forth in article 6.2 of the 14, 2018) (allowing access to detailed designs, such as the MRV, emissions limits, program coverage, compliance instruments, allowances distribution, offsets, and linkage).
66 PA. 73 In fact, Québec submitted comments on guidance regarding article 6.2 to the SBSTA. 74 Its submission addressed the transparency of the province's C&T program and the main program features aimed at achieving environmental integrity. 75 Québec also reported that it had developed its program in conformity with "the environmental integrity standards set out in decision 2/CP.17, paragraph 79 and 1/CP.18, paragraph 42 in the sense that it must deliver GHG emission reductions that are real, verifiable, permanent and additional, while avoiding double counting."
76

B. Building MRV Capacity to Enhance Transparency
Developing and operating ETSs builds MRV capacity, especially in emerging markets. Effective ETSs rely on accurate and updated data to help set the overall emissions limit and the allowance allocation plan. ETSs incentivize the establishment of MRV rules, which ensures transparency. Also, emission data gathered through new MRV regulatory systems could be valuable to existing initiatives. For example, integrating such MRV data with national GHG inventories for energy auditing and reporting can improve both GHG emissions and energy data collection. 77 China's evolving ETS is one of the emerging and inspiring stories. Between 2013 and 2014, the world's biggest GHG emitter launched pilot ETSs in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Hubei, and Chongqing. As of September 2016, they involved some 3000 key enterprises in over 20 industries. 78 In December 2016, Fujian also started its ETS with a focus on carbon sinks. 79 Concurrently, a national ETS (NETS)
has been under development since 2014. 80 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the department within the State Council responsible for developing and managing the ETS nationwide. 81 On December 18, 2017, the NDRC announced a detailed plan for building the NETS that marked its official launch. 82 It is intended to start with the electricity generation industry, and gradually include more industries and tradable products. 83 The following figure presents a draft timeline the NDRC plans to roll out the NETS. 83. NETS PLAN, supra note 82, at 2. This plan consists of eight parts: (1) general requirements: guidelines, principles, objectives; (2) market elements: trading participants, tradable products, platforms; (3) participants: key emitters; regulatory authorities; verification bodies; (4) institutional development: MRV system, allowance management, trading rules; (5) allowance management in the electricity generation industry: allowance allocation and surrender; (6) supporting systems: reporting, registration, trading, transaction settlement; (7) pilot ETSs in transition; (8) safeguard measures: organization and leadership, fulfillment of responsibilities, capacity building, and guidance and knowledge sharing.
84.
Id. at 3. Notably, this plan would be a living instrument because the development and reform departments under the State Council, in conjunction with other relevant departments, may adjust and improve the plan as required on a timely basis. See id. at 6-7. Prior to launching those pilots, China did not have a national or regional GHG accounting and reporting system. 85 So far, all the jurisdictions with pilot ETSs have adopted local rules on GHG emissions. These jurisdictions have formulated methods and guidelines for counting emissions from key enterprises. They have also established reporting platforms.
86 Nationally, China's commitment to GHG emissions profile disclosure was written into the State Council's GHG Control Plan for the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). 87 The NDRC has circulated • Launching spot trading in the electricity generation industry (only for compliance purposes: surrendered allowances will be cancelled; the remaining allowances may be transfered and traded across compliance periods) • Including more industries, tradable products, and trading methods, provided that the trading in the electricity generation industry is stable • Creating opportunities for certified voluntary emisisons reductions to be covered by the NETS as soon as possible departmental rules and policy prescriptions. 88 The NDRC also submitted the Draft NETS Regulations to the State Council for review and discussion.
89 Table 3 is a summary of the legislation and applicable policies. These instruments stipulate reporting requirements, including general GHG reporting rules and the reporting-related provisions designed for the ETS. Table 4 further illustrates who must report, what to report, and how to report. This table also contains information on verification of reporting and enforcement measures. . These measures were formulated to implement the 12th FYP and relevant GHG Control Plan. They provide general requirements for allowance management, emissions trading, verification and allowance surrender, supervision and governance, and liabilities. In particular, the departments responsible for the ETS are required to announce in due course the scope of industries, types of GHGs, and standards for determining key emitters (art. 6). As shown in Tables 3 and  4 , the NDRC has specified some of the issues in a series of notices/orders, such as the GHG Reporting Notice and the NETS Plan. Its General Office issued the Reporting Guidelines, the NETS Launching Notice, and the 2016-2017 MRV Notice. Although the title specifies that it is for the electricity generation industry, many provisions of this plan (see note 83) are general requirements and could implicate other industries.
97. The information in Table 4 was selected and summarized from the instruments in Table 3. 98.
The NDRC considers captive power plants in any industry that meet the condition of GHG emissions in (2) as the enterprises in the electricity industry.
99. In addition to the six GHGs, the Interim ETS Measures added NF3, see art. 47 (defining GHGs as "natural and man-made gaseous components that absorb and reemit infrared radiation in the atmosphere, including CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6, and NF3"). 101. See Interim ETS Measures, supra note 95, at art. 38-39 (requiring the establishment of a credit management system that could review and maintain the credit records of key emitters, verification bodies, trading agencies, and other practitioners, as well as a blacklist that could expose those severely violating law and being dishonest).
102. See id., ch. 6. This entire chapter is dedicated to "Liability." For example, key emitters who refuse to fulfill reporting obligations or to submit verification reports will be ordered by provincial ETS authorities to make corrections within a time limit. Those failing to do so will be given administrative penalties pursuant to law (art. 40.1). For verification bodies, when issuing false reports, making major errors, using or publicizing trade secrets of entities being verified without consent, or China's transition to the NETS is pushing progress in the MRV system. China does so by broadening the coverage of GHGs and emitters, solidifying the ETS legislation from departmental rules into administrative regulations, unifying the rules, and creating greater potential for linking with other carbon markets. In addition to the progress made in law and policy, China is presently exploring new technologies like blockchain applicable to managing carbon assets that can nurture transparency and trust. 103 This effort is in concert with the UNFCCC-facilitated initiative on blockchain and distributed ledger technology in support of climate action. 104 China's experience with developing the ETS and MRV may encourage other countries without mature MRV systems to use marketbased approaches to realize their emission reduction targets and operate more transparent schemes. 105 
IV. LINKING ETSS ENHANCES TRANSPARENCY
The national, subnational, and regional ETSs operating in some Parties to the PA have either already been linked or will likely be linked in future.
conducting other illegal activities, they will be given administrative penalties by provincial ETS authorities pursuant to law and reported to the national ETS authority. They will be suspended should the violation be severe. Pursuant to law, they will bear liability for payment of an award of damages for causing financial loss to key emitters or even criminal liability for committing crimes (art. 42).
103 preparing the NETS may be compromised by the lack of "a proper design and effective regulation"); Emil Dimantchev, Calling China's Carbon Markets 'Ambitious' Shows How Low the Bar Has Fallen, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Jun. 27, 2017, 5:27 PM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/06/27/calling-chinas-carbon-market-ambitious-shows-lowbar-fallen/ [https://perma.cc/L96B-DBXX] (criticizing the limited information shared by China on its market's key design features such as emissions cap, allowance allocation, and reserve methods, as well as questioning its ambition and effectiveness). Indeed, as shown in Tables 3 and 4 , China has made many efforts and progress in addressing those concerns. See also Deane et al., supra note 11, at 105-06 (observing China's growing attention to the transparency of its pilot ETSs, and that some shortcomings would not necessarily jeopardize the building of a transparent NETS). associated policy and legislative support. When preparing to link Québec's C&T program with California's or to let Ontario join the WCI regional market, the staff from each system "conducted line-by-line comparisons of the respective program regulations to harmonize them in every respect." 120 This series of review went well given that all the ETSs were built with the WCI recommendations. 121 The 2010 Design shows whether and how to link individual programs.
122 "This common framework and rules assure that all linkage candidates have a program of equivalent stringency, to ensure the environmental integrity of the carbon market." 123 provides that, "The intended outcome of the harmonization and integration is to enable each Party under its own statutory and regulatory authority to…enable the sharing of information to support effective administration and enforcement of each party's statutes and regulations." 128 In the harmonization and integration process, article 3.2 prescribes that all Parties shall respect the procedural requirements of each Party, "including appropriate and effective openness and transparency of each Party's public consultations." 129 The Parties shall discuss and/or consult with each other before any changes or additions are made to their programs. A sufficient period of time shall be given for public review and comment prior to the adoption of those changes or additions. 130 During the supervision and enforcement of this agreement, "The Parties shall work cooperatively to maintain market integrity, including preventing fraud, abuse and market manipulation and to ensure the reliability of the joint auction and their respective programs." 131 Peer review improves data reporting and information sharing between partners; it also incentivizes them to improve their own MRV standards to be equally effective and able to link their ETSs. This addresses the concern that design features in a less stringent ETS can extend to all other linked schemes and compromise the environmental rigor of a market. 132 Indeed, some authors indicate that trading allowances is more likely to proceed when programs share equivalent MRV and enforcement measures. 133 This was the case for Québec when it amended the Mandatory Reporting Regulation. In one instance, Québec added rules to improve the methods for assessing missing data and ensure the accuracy of measured data before linking with California. 134 Likewise, Ontario amended relevant regulations for implementing and operating a linked C&T program. 135 Comparing and harmonizing the proposed linked programs-including MRV regulationsenables equivalent market rules, environmental integrity, and compliance requirements among those jurisdictions.
136
Internationally, Québec brought the linkage issue discussed above to the negotiation of the PAWP development. In its submission to the SBSTA, Québec considered environmental integrity as "a pre-condition for full linking."
137 A thorough review of each jurisdiction's environmental integrity parameters and associated regulations can ensure that "regulatory language variations did not give way to differences of implementation between partner jurisdictions that could jeopardize the implementation, and alter the environmental integrity, of the common market." 138 Québec believed that jurisdictions that transfer allowances internationally should demonstrate that environmental integrity is a paramount concern in the design and operation of their programs. 139 Québec and Ontario also informed the Canadian federal government of their intention to collaborate with California and to establish an accounting mechanism for the flow of GHG emissions allowance within the WCI regional market. 140 As they suggested, this mechanism could inform the interpretation and implementation of the PA's article 6.2. 141 They further stressed that it should ensure "a transparent and data-driven calculation that attributes to each Party its portion of the total [GHG emissions reductions] achieved jointly by the Parties."
142 They attached great importance to the mechanism's consistency with relevant national and international principles and criteria concerning environmental integrity and robust accounting.
143
C. Risks
The practice discussed above reveals how linking ETSs can promote MRV requirements and transparency. Benefits generated from bilateral or regional partnerships could be useful in implementing multilateral agreements such as the PA. The WCI regional partnership is arguably the
